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Military Triers of Fact: A Needless Deprivation of
Constitutional Protections?
During the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has begun to de-
fine the scope of the sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by jury. 1 The
Court, however, has not indicated the extent to which these recent deci-
sions apply to a member of the armed forces in a trial by court-martial.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the applicabil-
ity of the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee to the military justice
system, it has confronted issues that bear directly on the relationship
between action taken in the name of the military and the protected
freedoms of the Bill of Rights. 2 Generally, these recent decisions have
attempted to determine whether the disputed exercise of military power
is compatible with the preservation of the freedoms intended to be in-
sulated by the Bill of Rights.3
Determining whether constitutional rights shall be limited or de-
nied to American citizens because of their enlistment in the armed
forces is a troublesome task. On the one hand, the enforcement of mili-
tary discipline by a separate military justice system4 must be a high
priority if the military is to function effectively.5 Nevertheless, this
broad application of military power must be limited, or individuals
may forfeit constitutionally guaranteed rights unnecessarily.
Historically, the civilian courts have refrained from questioning
the decisions of military courts.6 Although this attitude has changed
significantly in recent years, especially in areas in which fundamental
rights are at issue,7 the civil judiciary is still reluctant to intervene by
reviewing military court decisions.8 This reluctance by the federal
1. See, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223
(1978); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
2. See, ag., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles,
350 U.S. 11 (1955); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). See generally Warren, The Bill of
Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Warren].
3. Warren, supra note 2, at 182-83.
4. See text accompanying notes 34-37 infra.
5. See notes 56-57 & accompanying text infra.
6. Until the Supreme Court indicated in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), that
court-martial proceedings could be challenged through habeas corpus actions brought in
civil courts, the Court had adhered consistently to its holding in Exparte Vallandigham, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863), that it lacked jurisdiction to review, by certiorari, the decisions of
the military courts. See Warren, supra note 2, at 187.
7. See Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
8. Many civilian courts reason that they are ill-equipped to determine the effect that
an intrusion upon military authority might have on discipline. Warren, supra note 2, at 187.
courts, coupled with the financial inability of many military defendants
to pursue federal court review of military court decisions,9 has limited
these defendants to relief in the military courts.10 Thus, absent specific
incorporation of the right to a sixth amendment jury trial in the statute
governing military court procedures, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ),II or a willingness on the part of the Court of Military
Appeals to expand the application of constitutional rights in the mili-
tary, 12 any change in current military jury practices is precluded as a
practical matter.
The arguments for and against application of sixth amendment
jury trial right to military prosecutions should be carefully weighed to
ensure that the denial of this right is justified and that the public's lack
of awareness and the defendant's financial situation do not prevent the
application of the protections afforded other citizens. The Court of
Military Appeals has refused to apply to military courts the require-
ments of jury size and the voting requirements set forth for civilian
criminal prosecutions by the Supreme Court in Ballew v. Georgia13 and
Burch v. Louisiana. 14 The failure to consider the relevance of these
Supreme Court decisions to the military makes the due process af-
forded under the military justice system different from that afforded
under the civilian system.
This Comment focuses on the balancing of military necessity
against individual rights in discussing the applicability of the sixth
9. As the legal costs for mounting collateral attacks continue to increase, the military
defendant has become less able to litigate without financial assistance. It is the policy of the
military that a military lawyer cannot litigate in federal court on behalf of the defendant.
Interview with Cdr. James Walker, District Legal Officer, USCG, Western Area, in San
Francisco, California (July 1981).
10. The type of review afforded courts-martial proceedings depends on the class of
court-martial and the punishment that is imposed. The court-martial usually results in re-
view by the convening authority and the Judge Advocate General. See UNIFORM CODE OF
MILITARY JUSTICE (UCMJ) art. 65, 10 U.S.C. § 865 (1976). The UCMJ requires that certain
cases forwarded to the Judge Advocate General be referred to a Court of Military Review.
See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 66(b), 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) 1976. In most
cases, review by the Court of Military Appeals is discretionary and concludes direct review
of court-martial proceedings. Congress has provided that determinations of the Court of
Military Appeals are not subject to federal court review except in cases of collateral attack.
See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARTY JUSTICE art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1976). Review in the
federal court system usually takes place on application for a writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g.,
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976); Noyd v. Bond, 393 U.S. 683 (1969); Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). See generally Note, United States v. Booker: The Institutional
Implications of the Court of Military Appeals' Immunityfrom Direct Supreme Court Review,
59 B.U.L. REv. 754 (1979).
11. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1,
64 Stat. 108). See note 34 infra. See also note 39 infra.
12. See notes 108-09 & text accompanying infra.
13. 435 U.S. 223 (1978). See notes 28-30 infra.
14. 441 U.S. 130 (1979). See notes 32-33 infra.
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amendment right to jury trial to the military justice system, and dis-
cusses the applicability of the holdings in Ballew and Burch to trial by
courts-martial. After comparing the two systems, the Comment evalu-
ates the arguments for and against using the same standards for all
defendants regardless of military affiliation. The Comment concludes
that, even if a randomly selected panel of jurors representing a cross-
section of the geographical community is inappropriate for all military
trials, military panels should be composed of randomly selected mem-
bers of the military community and that military panels should con-
form to the minimum size and voting requirements mandated by the
Supreme Court for criminal trials in the civilian sector.
The Supreme Court and the Right to Trial by Jury
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... ,,15 It was not until
1968, however, that the Supreme Court began to interpret the scope of
the sixth amendment right to trial by jury.
In Duncan v. Louisiana,16 the Supreme Court held that the right to
trial by jury is fundamental and is applicable not only in federal courts
but also in state courts under the fourteenth amendment.17 Emphasiz-
ing the importance of the right to trial by jury in the fair administration
of justice, the Court noted that historically, the right to trial by jury
operated as an important protection against arbitrary rule and created
a barrier "'between the liberties of the people and the prerogative of
the crown.' "s The Court, however, did express the limitation that the
right to jury trial need not extend to prosecutions of petty crimes,' 9 and
indicated that the penalty authorized for a particular crime would be
the determinative factor in defining the boundary between serious and
petty offenses.20
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
17. Id. at 149 (rejecting prior dicta in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), in
which the Court had stated that the right to trial by jury was not fundamental and thus not
applicable to the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). 302
U.S. at 325.
18. 391 U.S. at 151 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 349-50 (Cooley ed. 1899)).
19. 391 U.S. at 158: "We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial-or any
particular trial-held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as
fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury. Thus we hold no constitutional doubts
about the practices of accepting waivers of jury trials and prosecuting petty crimes without
extending a right to jury trial."
20. Id. at 159. See generaly Note, Constitutional Law--Jury Trial-Right to Jury Trial
in State Criminal Proceedings, 82 HARv. L. REv. 93, 148-53 (1968); Note, Criminal Proce-
dure-Jury Trialsfor Misdemeanors, 15 Loy. L. REv. 138 (1968-69); Note, Constitutional
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Two years after Duncan, the Supreme Court in Baldwin v. New
York 2' reaffirmed the Duncan holding that the right to jury trial is
mandated by the sixth amendment for all serious crimes, but that petty
crimes may be tried without a jury. The Court then explained the lim-
its of the rule by stating that no offense can be deemed petty, for the
purposes of the right to trial by jury, when imprisonment for more than
six months is authorized.
22
In the decade that followed the Duncan and Baldwin decisions, the
Supreme Court addressed several issues concerning the minimum size
and voting requirements of juries in criminal prosecutions.23 Prior to
these decisions, the Court had never directly addressed the much-de-
bated issue of whether the federal system's twelve juror and unanimous
verdict requirements are required by the Constitution or are merely
historical accidents.
In Williams v. Florida,24 announced in 1970 on the same day as
Baldwin, the Court upheld a conviction based on a Florida rule al-
lowing six-person juries in non-capital cases. The Court stated that a
twelve-member jury was an historical accident2 5 and that the goals of
jury deliberation are not "in any meaningful sense less likely to be
achieved when the jury numbers six, than when it numbers twelve-
particularly if the requirement of unanimity is retained. ' 26 The Court
expressly declined to decide the number of jurors required for con-
stitutionality.
2 7
Law.- Extension of Right to Jury Trial in State Criminal Prosecution, 53 MINN. L. REV. 414
(1968); Note, Criminal Procedure--Sixth Amendment Right to Trial by Jury Applied to the
States Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 TUL. L. REV. 398 (1969); Note, Constitutional
Law--Fourteenth Amendment Entitles Defendants Charged with Serious Crimes in State
Courts to Trial by Jury, 21 VAND. L. REv. 1099 (1968).
21. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
22. Id. at 69.
23. See, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223
(1978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1969).
24. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
25. Id. at 102.
26. Id. at 100. See general, Note, Constitutional Law-Trial by Jury-Unanimity in
Criminal Trials, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law--Non-Unan-
imous Jury Verdicts-The Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments Do Not Require Unanimous
Jury Verdicts in State Criminal Trials, 61 GEO. L.J. 223 (1972); Note, Constitutional Law-
Jury Trial-Nonunamious Jury Verdicts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 50, 148-156 (1973); Note, Crimi-
nal Procedure-Majority Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 40 TENN. L. REV. 91 (1972); Note, Con-
stitutional Law-Juries-Nonunanimous Verdicts in State Criminal Proceedings Do Not
Violate Due Process, 26 VAND. L. REV. 365 (1973).
27. 399 U.S. at 103. See generally Note, Constitutional Law-Defendant's Right to a
Jury Trial-Is Six Enough, 59 Ky. L.J. 996 (1971); Zeisel & Diamond, "Convincing Empiri-
cal Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1974); Note, Constitutional
Law-State and Federal Criminal Procedure, 84 HARV. L. REV. 30, 165-71 (1970); Rogge,
Williams v. Florida.- End of a Theory, Part I, 16 VILL. L. REV. 411 (1971).
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In 1978, the Court held in Ballew v. Georgia28 that a jury com-
posed of fewer than six members is unconstitutional. A provision in
the Georgia Constitution permitted five-person juries for certain of-
fenses, including offenses that carried a penalty of imprisonment for
one year. Although recognizing a difficulty in distinguishing between a
five-member jury and- the six-member jury that had been declared con-
stitutional in Williams,29 the Court found the smaller jury unconstitu-
tional,30 basing its decision on psychological studies analyzing the
reliability of group decisions.
31
For many of the same reasons that led the Court in Ballew to de-
cide that the use of a five-member jury threatened the fairness of the
proceeding and the proper role of the jury, the Court in Burch v. Louisi-
ana32 found unconstitutional a Louisiana law that permitted criminal
conviction of defendants based on less than unanimous verdicts of six-
person juries.33 The Court thus required that verdicts of six-person ju-
ries be unanimous to sustain convictions for non-petty offenses. The
importknce placed on the right to jury trial in Duncan, and the later
emphasis placed on size and unanimity in Ballew and Burch, have
shown that the Supreme Court considers these standards of minimum
jury size and voting requirements essential to a fair trial.
28. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
29. Id. at 239.
30. Id "[Tihe purpose and functioning of the jury in a criminal trial is seriously im-
paired, and to a constitutional degree, by a reduction in size to below six members."
31. For a discussion of these studies and the Court's rationale for adopting them, see
notes 124-34 & accompanying text infra. See generally Note, Right to Trial by Jury.- New
Guidelinesfor State Criminal Trial Juries, 40 LA. L. REv. 837 (1980); Note, Right to Trial by
Jury-Sixth Amendment-4 Five-Member Jury Does Not Satisfy the Jury Trial Guarantee of
the Sixth Amendment, 47 U. CirN. L. REv. 524 (1978).
32. 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
33. Id. at 138. But see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). InApodaca, the Court
held that unanimity of a twelve-person jury is not necessary to maintain a criminal convic-
tion. The Court in Apodaca was persuaded in part by the rejection of a version of the sixth
amendment proposed by James Madison to Congress in 1789 that would have required that
the "impartial jury" have "the requisite of unanimity for conviction." Id. at 409. The Court
considered this an explicit rejection of a proposal "to specify precisely which of the com-
mon-law requisites of the jury were to be-preserved by the Constitution," thus leaving "such
specification to the future." Id. at 410. Focusing the inquiry upon the function "served by
the jury in contemporary society," id., the Court perceived "no difference between juries
required to convict or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11 to one .... [I]n either case, the
interest of the defendant in having the judgment of his peers interposed between himself and
the officers of the State who prosecute and judge him is equally well served." Id. at 411. See
generally Note, Constitutional Law-Conviction by a Nonunanimous Six Person Juryfor a
Nonpetty Offense is Violative of the Right to Trial by Jury, 23 How. L.J. 339 (1980); Note,
Right to Trial by Jury: New Guidelinesfor State Criminal Trial Juries, 40 LA. L. REv. 837
(1980); Note, Constitutional Criminal Procedure-Six-Member Juries Must Render Unani-
mous Verdicts in State Criminal Trialsfor Nonpetty Offenses, 54 TUL. L. REv. 1178 (1980).
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The Military Justice System
The military justice system is a criminal justice system created by
Congress pursuant to article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which au-
thorizes Congress "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy 34 and "[t]o make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces. ' 35 These provisions authorize Congress to establish a separate
system for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses,
36
unconnected with the judicial power of the United States defined in
article III of the Constitution.
37
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),38 the statutory
source for offenses punishable under the military justice system, out-
lines the basic procedures that must be followed for the prosecution of
these offenses.39 Some acts punishable under the UCMJ are offenses
peculiar to the military,40 while others are offenses that are crimes in
almost every jurisdiction as well as under the UCMJ.4 1 The UCMJ
grants to military courts jurisdiction to prosecute all violations of the
UCMJ. 42 Thus, to the extent that the procedural requirements of a
military court-martial vary from those of a civilian court, the quality of
an accused's constitutional rights may vary between the two systems,
although the charge may be common to both systems.
The UCMJ authorizes three types of courts-martial: summary,
special, and general.43 The distinguishing feature of these courts-mar-
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
35. Id., cl. 14.
36. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
37. U.S. CONST. art. III.
38. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1,
64 Stat. 108, 108).
39. The procedures outlined in the UCMJ are augmented by the Manualfor Courts-
Martial, which documents additional procedural requirements promulgated by the Presi-
dent under authority granted by the UCMJ. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL (rev. ed. 1969) (published pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11476, 34 Fed.
Reg. 10502 (1969)).
40. Offenses such as sleeping on watch, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 113,
10 U.S.C. § 913 (1976), showing disrespect to a superior officer, id. art. 89, 10 U.S.C. § 889
(1976), and being absent without leave from one's appointed place of duty, id. art. 86, 10
U.S.C. § 886 (1976), are punishable by criminal prosecution only under the military justice
system.
41. See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 118-31, 10 U.S.C. §§ 918-931
(1976). Crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, assault, larceny, manslaughter, and posses-
sion of narcotics are punishable in all jurisdictions. See also U.S. DEFT. OF DEFENSE, MAN-
UAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL $ 213, at 28-71 (rev. ed. 1969), which interprets the reference to
"crimes and offenses not capital" in UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 134, 10
U.S.C. § 934 (1976), as incorporating by reference all noncapital federal crimes.
42. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 17, 10 U.S.C. § 817 (1976).
43. 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-820 (1976).
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tial lies principally in the maximum punishment that may be imposed
under each.
The summary court-martial involves the fewest formalities and re-
quires the approval of the accused before it can be convened. 4 This
proceeding bears greater resemblance to an informal nonjudicial dispo-
sition than to a criminal prosecution: a defendant may be convicted
and sentenced notwithstanding the fact that he or she is not represented
by counsel,45 and the proceeding is conducted by a commissioned of-
ficer, who need not be judge or lawyer, and who performs the functions
of judge, factfinder, prosecutor, and defense counsel.46 The maximum
sentence that may be imposed by a summary court-martial is, in the
alternative, one month of confinement at hard labor, forty-five days of
hard labor without confinement, or two months of restriction to speci-
fied limits. In addition to these punishments, the court may also re-
quire forfeiture of two-thirds pay for one month, and reduction to the
lowest pay grade.47
If the accused is a commissioned officer or has refused a trial by
summary court-martial, the case will be referred to a general or special
court-martial. The special court-martial is next in severity to the sum-
mary court-martial, and has jurisdiction to hear all noncapital offenses
in the military justice system.48 The accused must be provided with
counsel before the court may be convened,49 and the case is prosecuted
by the trial counsel, usually a military lawyer. A special court-martial
must be composed of at least three members of the service who are
personally selected by an officer, the convening authority, unless the
accused requests a trial by a military judge alone.50 The maximum
penalty that can be imposed by the special court-martial is either six
months of confinement or three months of hard labor without confine-
ment.5 1 Forfeiture of up to two-thirds pay per month for six months
and, under certain circumstances, a bad-conduct discharge, are poten-
44. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1976).
45. See text accompanying notes 94-95 infra.
46. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 32 (1976).
47. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1976). Enlisted
persons above the fourth enlisted pay grade may not be sentenced to confinement at hard
labor by a summary court-martial, or to reduction of pay except to the next inferior grade.
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 16(b) (rev. ed. 1969).
48. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1976).
49. Id. art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1976).
50. Id. art 16(2), 10 U.S.C. § 816(2) (1976) provides that a special court-martial may be
composed of: "(A) not less than three members; or (B). a military judge and not less than
three members; or (C) only a military judge, if one has been detailed to the court ... ." A
request by the accused for a court composed only of a military judge must be made in
writing, with knowledge of the identity of the military judge, after consultation with counsel,
and is subject to the approval of the military judge. Id.
51. Id. art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1976).
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tial penalties. 52
The general court-martial is the military's court of general juris-
diction; it may try a member of the service for any violation of the
UCMJ. There are few procedural differences between the special and
general courts-martial, except that the general court may be convened
only after a statutorily mandated investigation, 53 and must be com-
posed of a least five members, rather than three, except when con-
ducted by a military judge alone.54 The major difference between the
two types of courts-martial is that the general court-martial, unlike the
summary or special court-martial, may impose any punishment, in-
cluding the death penalty, not expressly forbidden by the UCMJ. 55
Military Necessity as a Theoretical Justification for a Separate Military
Justice System
"Military necessity" is a term that often is used to describe the
need for a separate system of justice in the military. The separate sys-
tem has been thought to be necessary because its objectives are differ-
ent from those of the civilian criminal justice system.56 Military law
exists as a separate jurisprudence, apart from the law that governs civil-
ian offenses, because "the rights of men in the armed forces must per-
force be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline
and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must deter-
mine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers
expressly entrusted that task to Congress."
57
It has been suggested, however, that the theoretical justifications
for a separate system of military justice do not apply to the modern
military.58 The "gradual convergence of military and civilian social
52. Id. A bad-conduct discharge may not be imposed unless a military judge was de-
tailed to the trial, except when prevented by physical conditions or military exigencies.
53. Id. art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1976).
54. Id. art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1976).
55. Id. art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1976). The Manualfor Courts-Martial lists expressly
prohibited punishments. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 125-
126a (rev. ed. 1969).
56. "Civilian criminal justice is designed in the main to deter individuals from abnor-
mal or unconventional behavior in communities where there are few, if any, restrictions on,
for example, their freedom to travel, or their selection of employment, residence or mode of
dress. Military justice, on the other hand, is designed to control individuals in very peculiar
circumstances, such as combat, and to require from them the performance of oftentimes
disagreeable and undesirable tasks. The soldier may not go where and when he pleases; he
may not choose his job or quit if he doesn't like what he is ordered to do; he lives under
abnormal conditions; and he is told what to wear. In short, the military justice system is
designed to implement disciplines as well as to punish obvious criminal conduct." W.
SCHUG, UNITED STATES LAW AND THE ARMED FORCES 123 (1972).
57. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1952).
58. Sherman, MILITARY JUSTICE WITHOUT MILITARY CONTROL, 82 YALE L.J. 1398,
1401-02 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sherman].
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structures due to technology and the bureaucratization of military
functions" counters the assertion that "the military is a society apart
from civilian life which requires different legal standards the civilian
courts cannot appreciate or adequately enforce. ' 59 Moreover, that ci-
vilian legal standards govern police and fire department work, which
require a special discipline "in their need for precise execution of duties
during occasionally dangerous missions," counters the argument that
civilian courts are unequipped to deal with the exigencies of a military
context requiring a balancing of competing policies. 60 Finally, the con-
cept of the military justice system as a vehicle for enforcement of mili-
tary discipline is countered by the punishment powers granted by
article 15 of the UCMJ, 61 which permits the enforcement, by non-judi-
cial means, of the necessary discipline peculiar to the military.
62
Over the last three decades, however, the Supreme Court has indi-
cated a reluctance to recognize an unlimited military power by its nar-
rowing the jurisdiction of the military courts under the UCMJ. In
1955, the Court in United States ex re. Toth v. Quarles63 held that a
person who has been discharged may not constitutionally be subjected
to trial by court-martial for an offense committed while a member of
the armed forces. The Court was unwilling to construe the language of
article 164 beyond a grant of power to Congress to establish court-mar-
tial jurisdiction over "persons who are actually members or part of the
armed forces."'65 The "compelling reason" for a narrow construction of
this clause was found in the Constitution: "[A]ny expansion of court-
martial jurisdiction. . . necessarily encroaches on the jurisdiction of
federal courts set up under article III of the Constitution where persons
on trial are surrounded with more constitutional safeguards than in
military tribunals. '66
The Court also emphasized the lack of any special military disci-
pline justification for expanding court-martial jurisdiction to "some ci-
vilian ex-soldier who has been wholly separated from the service,"'67
"at the expense of the normal and constitutionally preferable system of
59. Id. at 1401. Professor Sherman notes the technical, administrative, and clerical
nature of the work performed by most enlisted personnel and the general trend in the armed
forces towards a greater degree of individuality and privacy for their members as support for
the observation that "the distinctiveness of military life is questionable at best." Id. at 1401
& n.15.
60. Id. at 1402.
61. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1976).
62. Sherman, supra note 58, at 1402.
63. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 14 (quoted in text accompanying note 35 supra).
65. 350 U.S. at 15.
66. Id.
67. Id at 22.
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trial by jury. ' 68
In 1957, in Reid v. Covert, 69 the Court ruled that wives, children,
and other dependents of armed services personnel are not members of
the armed forces subject to court-martial jurisdiction, merely "because
the Government helps them live as members of a soldier's family. 70
Writing for the Court, Justice Black emphasized the historical mistrust
of the military as a "necessary institution, but-one dangerous to liberty
if not confined within its essential bounds."'7' He noted that "it was not
until 1863 that Congress first authorized the trial of soldiers, in wartime,
for civil crimes such as murder, arson, rape, etc. by courts-martial,"
72
and that even so, in Coleman v. Tennessee,73 the Court had "declined to
construe the 1863 statute as depriving civilian courts of a concurrent
jurisdiction to try soldiers for crimes." 74 The opinion in Reid again
noted the nature of military jurisdiction as "a very limited and ex-
traordinary jurisdiction. . . intended to be only a narrow exception to
the normal and preferred method of trial in courts of law."
75
While these cases make a clear distinction between military and
civilian jurisdiction based on the identity of the accused as a member of
the armed forces, the Supreme Court has narrowed military jurisdic-
tion by its distinction based on the nature of the offense. In 1969, in
O'Callahan v. Parker,76 the Court concluded that to come under mili-
tary jurisdiction the crime must be "service connected." 77 This conclu-
sion was based on the premise that, although the justification for a
system of specialized military courts rests on the special needs of the
military to establish an effective national defense, because these courts
lack the procedural safeguards of their civilian counterparts, "expan-
sion of military discipline beyond its proper domain carries with it a
threat to liberty. ' 78 The Court held that the offense in O'Callahan was
not within court-martial jurisdiction because, although the defendant
68. Id. at 22-23. In a footnote, the Court quoted from an opinion written by Justice
Sutherland in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485 (1935), which emphasized the preference
for a trial by jury: "Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance
and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment
of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care." 350 U.S. at 23 n.22.
69. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
70. Id. at 23.
71. Id. at 24.
72. Id. at 23 n.42 (emphasis in original).
73. 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 509 (1878).
74. 354 U.S. at 24.
75. Id. at21: "Every extension of military jurisdiction is an encroachment on the juris-
diction of the civil courts, and, more important, acts as a deprivation of the right to jury trial
and other treasured constitutional protections."
76. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
77. Id. at 272.
78. Id. at 265.
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was an active member of the armed forces, the crime charged was not
service-connected.
The factors upon which the O'Callahan court relied for its result
seem to fall into two general categories: those that relate to the place of
the crime and those that relate to the connection between the offense
charged and military duties, property, or authority. Within the first
category, the Court emphasized that (1) the crime was committed away
from the base and at a place not under military control; and (2) the
crime was committed within the territorial limits of the United States,
thus ensuring the availability of a civilian court in which the case could
be prosecuted. Within the second category, the Court emphasized that
(1) the defendant was properly absent from the military base; (2) there
was no connection between the defendant's military duties and the
crime charged; (3) the victim was not performing any duties relating to
the military; (4) there was no threat to a military post or violation of
military property; (5) the offense did not involve the flouting of military
authority; and (6) the crime was a peacetime offense, not involving au-
thority stemming from the war power.79 Implicit in these factors is an-
other: the offense in O'Callahan was among those traditionally
prosecuted in civilian courts.80 Because in the aggregate these factors
pointed to the conclusion that in O'Callahan court-martial jurisdiction
was not justified, the opinion did not present a formula for determining
the precise balance of factors that would establish the service connec-
tion justifying military jurisdiction. In a later case, Relford v. Comman-
dant,81 the Court, taking an ad hoc approach, applied the O'Callahan
factors to find "service-connected" any offense "committed by [military
personnel] within or at the geographical boundary of a military post
and violative of the security of a person or of property there. '82 The
Court upheld the court-martial conviction of a military person for the
on-base rape of two civilians.
The Reford Court rejected the defendant's argument that to be
service-connected the offense must be "military in nature, that is, one
involving a level of conduct required only of servicemen and, because
of the special needs of the military, one demanding military discipli-
nary action."' 3 The rejection of so narrow a definition of service con-
nected indicates that the special considerations of military discipline
and security apply even when the offense charged is one traditionally
prosecuted in civilian courts.
79. Id. at 273-74.
80. The defendant in O'Callahan was charged with attempted rape, housebreaking,
and assault with intent to rape. Id. at 260. The implied factor was noted in a later case,
Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971). See text accompanying notes 81-83 infra.
81. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
82. Id. at 369.
83. Id. at 363.
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In each of these cases, the Supreme Court recognized the conflict
between constitutional guarantees and military necessity. The narrow-
ing court-martial jurisdiction by the Supreme Court to actual members
accused of service-connected offenses reflects a strong preference for
the civilian process.
84
The Right to Trial by Jury in Military Courts-Martial
Within the court-martial jurisdiction still recognized by the
Supreme Court, the Court has adhered to the view that the right to trial
by jury is not constitutionally mandated.85 In 1866, in Ex Parte Milli-
gan ,86 the Supreme Court observed in dicta that "the framers of the
Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by jury, in the
sixth amendment, to those persons who were subject to indictment or
presentment in the fifth."' 87 The Court again commented on this issue
in dicta in the 1942 wartime case of Ex Parte Quirin,88 in which the
Court, citing Milligan, stated that "[cases arising in the land or naval
forces] are expressly excepted from the Fifth Amendment, and are
deemed excepted by implication from the Sixth." 89
The Quirin Court relied on the language in the fifth amendment
excluding "cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the Militia
when in actual service in time of War or public danger." 90 The Court
suggested that the objective of this fifth amendment exception is to au-
thorize "the trial by court-martial of the members of our Armed Forces
for all that class of crimes which under the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments might otherwise have been deemed triable in the civil courts." 9'
84. Id. at 367.
85. "There are dangers lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided by
the Bill of Rights and Article III of our Constitution. Free countries of the world have tried
to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to
maintaining discipline among troops in active service ....
"Determining the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to authorize trial by
court-martial presents another instance calling for limitation to 'the least possible power ade-
quate to the endproposed.' " United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22-23 (1955)
(emphasis in original).
86. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
87. Id. at 123. The fifth amendment states, in part: "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger .. " U.S. CONST. amend V. The sixth amend-
ment states, in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed. ... U.S. CoNsr. amend VI.
88. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Quirin involved the wartime trial of German spies.
89. Id. at 40.
90. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
91. 317 U.S. at 43.
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Thirty-seven years later, in O'Callahan v. Parker,92 the Court adhered
to the Exparte Quirin suggestion that the sixth amendment right to jury
trial falls within the fifth amendment exception from the requirement
of a grand jury indictment for "cases arising in the land and naval
forces."
93
Whether the Court would rule similarly today is questionable, in
light of recent dicta in Middendorf v. Henry.94 In Middendof, several
enlisted members of the United States Marine Corps, all of whom had
been tried or ordered to stand trial at summary courts-martial, brought
a class action in federal court challenging the authority of the military
to try them at summary courts-martial without providing them with
counsel. The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the question of
whether the sixth amendment required plantiffs in court-martial pro-
ceedings to be provided with counsel because it found that a summary
court-martial is not a "criminal prosecution" for the purposes of the
sixth amendment. 95 Responding to the argument of Justice Marshall in
dissent that the sixth amendment right to counsel does apply to courts-
martial,96 the Court stated:
Since under our Brother Marshall's analysis the Sixth Amendment
applies to the military, it would appear that not only the right to
counsel but the right to jury trial, which is likewise guaranteed by
that Amendment, would come with it. While under Duncan v. Loui-
siana such a right would presumably not obtain in cases of summary
courts-martial because of the short periods of confinement which
they may impose, it would surely apply to special and general courts-
martial, which are empowered to impose sentences far in excess of
those held in Duncan to be the maximum which could be imposed
without a jury. Whatever may be the merits of "selective incorpora-
92. See text accompanying notes 76-80 supra.
93. 395 U.S. 258, 296-97 (1969). The Court in O'Callahan noted that the fifth amend-
ment language does not limit the exception to periods of "War or public danger" because
that clause only modifies "Militia." See note 86 supra. "Thus, the generally accepted rule is
that indictment by grand jury is never necessary in cases arising in the land or naval forces
... ."" Id. at 301 n.18 (emphasis in original).
94. 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
95. Id. at 34, 38-43. The Court conceded that the penalty imposed of confinement at
hard labor for periods of 20 to 30 days on the plaintiffs by the summary courts-martial was
"doubtless the military equivalent of imprisonment," which would trigger the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel under Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 425 U.S. at 34-35. It
likened the summary court-martial procedure to that of a probation or parole revocation
hearing, however, because of the nature of the proceedings and of the offense for which a
defendant can be tried, the limitations on punishments, and "the distinctive nature of mili-
tary life and discipline." Id. at 42 n.19. As such proceedings in the civilian context may
result in imprisonment, yet do not trigger the sixth amendment right to counsel, the Court
felt reluctant to apply Argersinger mechanically to the military context. Id. at 35-37 (citing
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)). See, however, the
extensive counter-argument of Justice Marshall, 425 U.S. at 55-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 52-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tion" under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment
makes absolutely no distinction between the right to jury trial and
the right to counsel.
97
Justice Marshall's analysis rested on two bases: (1) historical evi-
dence suggests that the framers of the Constitution intended the sixth
amendment right to counsel to apply to courts-martial; 98 and (2) even if
the historical evidence plainly showed to the contrary, such evidence
"would not be determinative of the contemporary scope of the Sixth
Amendment. '99 Justice Marshall suggested that, whatever the merits
97. 425 U.S. at 34 n.13 (emphasis added). Query whether even under this analysis the
right to trial by jury should apply to cases normally tried by a special court-martial. Under
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the right to jury trial extends to all defendants
charged with serious offenses. Id. at 158. See text accompanying notes 15-20 supra. Bald-
win v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), limited this right by defining serious crimes as those
for which a sentence in excess of six months' imprisonment might be imposed. Id. at 69.
See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra. Thus, the right should certainly attach in cases
tried by general courts-martial under the UCMJ, because that forum is empowered to im-
pose sentences well in excess of six months' imprisonment. See note 55 & accompanying
text supra. The maximum confinement sentence that can be imposed by a special court-
martial, however, is exactly six months, see note 51 & accompanying text supra, which is less
than the period of confinement required by the Supreme Court in Baldwin to constitute a
serious offense. On the other hand, the tribunal sitting in a special court-martial may im-
pose penalties in addition to imprisonment. See note 51 & accompanying text supra. The
Court in Baldwin, adhering to a rule of seriousness defined by the period of potential con-
finement, stated that the "disadvantages, onerous though they may be," of imprisonment for
six months or less, are "outweighed by the benefits that result from speedy and inexpensive
nonjury adjudication." 399 U.S. at 73. In Baldwin. the Court specifically stated that it de-
cided only that a potential sentence in excess of six months' imprisonment is sufficiently
severe to make an offense serious. Id. at 69 n.6. To date, the Supreme Court has never
considered how the interaction of confinement and other penalties might affect the dividing
line between serious and petty offenses. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-AN
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS 434 n.14 (1980). The right to jury
trial may attach to offenses triable to a special court-martial because of the weighty punish-
ments that can be imposed against a defendant in that forum in addition to the authorized
six months' confinement. For example, in addition to imprisonment, a military offender
may receive a bad-conduct discharge as a result of conviction by special court-martial. UNI-
FORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1976). The stigma of this puni-
tive discharge may have serious effects on the convicted offender's later opportunities for
employment. Also, offenses that are tried at special courts-martial are historically common
law felonies. It is not unusual for the accused at a special court-martial to be charged with
larceny, assault, indecent assault, or possession of dangerous drugs. The stigma that is at-
tached to a conviction of a crime that would be a common law felony and to a punitive
discharge, the loss of benefits that result from the imposition of a punitive discharge, and the
hardship resulting from the loss of two-thirds of six months' pay, see note 51 & accompany-
ing text supra, might persuade the Court that special court-martial convictions are non-petty
in nature and therefore that all fundamental sixth amendment rights should attach.
98. 425 U.S. at 52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. Id. To support the latter contention, Justice Marshall quoted the opinion of Chief
Justice Hughes in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), which had
stated: "If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it
means today, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined
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of arguments about express or implied exceptions based on historical
evidence, "[a]pplication of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the
military follows logically and naturally from the modem right-to-coun-
sel decisions. ... 100 The Middendorf Court's statement suggests that
the modem decisions concerning right to jury trial should be consid-
ered in determining the applicability of that right to the military.
Due Process and the Size, Voting, and Selection Requirements of Court-
Martial Members
In 1953, the Supreme Court stated in Burns v. Wilson 101 that "mili-
tary courts, like the state courts, have the same responsibilities as do the
federal courts to protect a person from a violation of his constitutional
rights."' 0 2 The Court, however, did not refer to all constitutional
rights.10 3 Rather, it considered the protection of fundamental fairness
in proceedings that lead to convictions by courts-martial. 0 4 As to that
aspect of court-martial proceedings, the Court stated:
[T]he constitutional guarantee of due process is meaningful enough,
and sufficiently adaptable, to protect soldiers-as well as civilians-
from the crude injustices of a trial so conducted that it becomes bent
on fixing guilt by dispensing with rudimentary fairness rather than
finding truth through adherence to those basic guarantees which
have long been recognized and honored by the military courts as well
as the civil courts.105
Thus, a trial, whether by jury or by court-martial, must meet require-
ments of fundamental fairness.106
to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would
have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation." 425 U.S. 53 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting B'laisdell, 290 U.S. at 442-43).
100. 425 U.S. at 53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
102. Id. at 142.
103. While the majority opinion in Burns did not specifically reaffirm the Milligan and
Quirin interpretation of the fifth amendment exception, it appears from language in the
dissent by Justice Douglas that there was little disagreement on that point: "Of course the
military tribunals are not governed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. That is the mean-
ing of Ex pare Quiin, holding that indictment by grand jury and trial by jury are not
constitutional requirements for trials before military commissions." Id. at 152 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
104. The petitioners in Burns alleged, among other things, that they had been subjected
to illegal detention, denied counsel and effective representation, and coerced into giving
confessions, and that their trials had been conducted in an atmosphere of terror and ven-
geance not conducive to fairness. .d. at 138.
105. Id. at 142-43.
106. Sensitive to this requirement, the Court in Afiddendoaf stated that its finding that
the summary court-martial procedure was not within the scope of the sixth amendment did
not answer the ultimate question of the plaintiff's entitlement to counseL That initial con-
clusion merely "shiftfed] the frame of reference from the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
counsel... to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against the deprivation of 'life, liberty, or
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Congress has provided for certain procedural protections in the
military courts-martial by incorporating within the UCMJ certain
rights similar to those embodied in the Bill of Rights. 10 7 Perhaps recog-
nizing the limits of the theoretical justifications for a separate military
justice system, 10 8 the Court of Military Appeals has gradually ex-
panded the application of civilian procedural protections to military
courts-martial beyond those specified in the UCMJ, indicating a
"growing acceptance of the court-martial as an impartial judicial pro-
ceeding rather than a disciplinary mechanism."109
property, without due process of law.'" 425 U.S. at 34. Despite the holding of the Court of
Military Appeals in United States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973), that
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1977), is applicable to the military and requires counsel
at summary courts-martial, the Supreme Court in Middendorf determined that the right to
counsel in summary courts-martial is not constitutionally mandated by the fifth amendment
due process clause. 425 U.S. at 43-47. The Court reached this conclusion by analyzing "the
interests of the individual and those of the regime to which he is subject." Id. at 43. The
Court gave deference to the congressional determination that counsel should not be pro-
vided in summary courts-martial although provided in special and general courts-martial.
See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 27, 38, 10 U.S.C. §§ 827, 838 (1976). 425
U.S. at 43 (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)). Although the holding of the
Court of Military Appeals in Alderman would have countered this deference, the Supreme
Court discounted the significance of that holding because of the sharply divided opinions of
the Court of Military Appeals in that case. 425 U.S. at 44-45. The Court was thus left with
the sole question of "whether the factors militating in favor of counsel at summary courts-
martial are so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress." Id.
at 44. The Court concluded that they were not, particularly because the military accused
need simply refuse a summary court-martial, see UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art.
20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1976), to be referred to a special court-martial in which he or she would
be afforded counsel. 425 U.S. at 46-47. The Court reasoned that the higher penalties thus
risked constituted a choice similar to that of pleading guilty to a lesser included offense, a
choice that is "a necessary part of the criminal justice system." Id. at 47-48.
107. For example, the UCMJ has extended to military accused the privilege against self-
incrimination, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1976), the
right to speedy trial, id. art. 33, 10 U.S.C. § 833, and the right to counsel at special and
general courts-martial, id. arts. 27, 38, 10 U.S.C. §§ 827, 838.
108. See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
109. Sherman, supra note 58, at 1402. For example, the court's examination of the va-
lidity of particular search warrants in United States v. Vierra, 14 C.M.A. 48, 33 C.M.R. 260
(1963), reflected the application of a reasonableness standard for searches and seizures in the
military system not unlike the standard applied in the civilian courts under fourth amend-
ment protection. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The right to counsel during custo-
dial interrogation established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as necessary to
protect a defendant's fifth amendment rights was extended to military personnel in United
States v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
Aside from the sixth amendment rights to speedy trial and to counsel at special and
general courts-martial specified in the UCMJ, the Court of Military Appeals has extended
other sixth amendment rights to the military. For example, in United States v. Jacoby, 11
C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1967), the court applied the right to confront witnesses to the
military accused. In United States v. Sweeney, 14 C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 379 (1964), the
Court of Military Appeals implicitly extended the right to compulsory service of process to
military accused by approvingly quoting the federal district court in United States v. Shib-
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The Court of Military Appeals has not extended the right to jury
trial to military accused, however, thus adhering to earlier Supreme
Court reasoning that courts-martial derive their authority from article I
of the Constitution, which gives power to Congress to make rules for
the government of the land and naval forces, and that courts-martial
are not part of the judiciary of the United States under article III.110
Thus, courts-martial are not bound by the sixth amendment's right to
trial by jury."II
In United States v. Tempia," 2 however, the Court of Military Ap-
peals held that the right to counsel during custodial interrogation, es-
tablished in Miranda v. Arizona 13 as necessary to protect a defendant's
fifth amendment rights, was extended to military personnel, stating:
"The impact of [Burns] is of an unequivocal holding by the Supreme
Court that the protections of the Constitution are available to service-
men in military trials."
' "14
The seeming inconsistency of these holdings was clarified in
ley, 112 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1953): "[Unless the military code specqfcallyprovides other-
wise, rules applicable to subpoena of witnesses before civil tribunals apply with equal force
to military tribunals." 14 C.M.A. at 604,34 C.M.R. at 384 (emphasis in original). In United
States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116 (C.M.A. 1977), the court expressly rejected the "military ex-
ception" rationale for denying a public trial to military accused. This overruled a previous
case, United States v. Brown, 7 C.M.A. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41 (1956), in which the Court of
Military Appeals had stated that, while military courts-martial do not have an absolute right
to close their doors to the public, "[flor reasons of military necessity, the trial of certain cases
in the armed services may require the exclusion of the public." 7 C.M.A. at 255, 22 C.M.R.
at 45. Grunden overruled Brown "to the extent that [Brown] implies a 'military exception' to
the right to a public trial for servicemen." 2 M.J. at 120 n.3.
110. See United States v. Kemp, 22 C.M.A. 152, 154,46 C.M.R. 152, 154 (1973); see also
United States v. Culp, 14 C.M.A. 199, 205-09, 33 C.M.R. 411, 421-22 (1963). See notes 85-
106 supra.
II1. United States v. Kemp, 22 C.M.A. 152, 154, 46 C.M.R. 152, 154 (1973). See gener-
ally H. MoYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY § 2-585, at 499 (1972). Because the Supreme
Court in Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, discussed in text accompanying notes 93-99
supra, did not decide the applicability of the sixth amendment to the military, the finding of
the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298,46 C.M.R. 298
(1973), dicussed in note 105 supra, that the sixth amendment right to counsel applies in the
military justice system, was not overruled byliddendolf. In light of the dicta in fiddendoif
that the sixth amendment makes no distinction between the right to jury trial and the right
to counsel, see quoted language in text accompanying note 96 supra, query the extent to
which the Court of Military Appeals, or Congress, may engage in a selective incorporation
of the Bill of Rights, which does distinguish between the right to jury trial and the right to
counsel. The UCMJ provides for the right to speedy trial and to counsel at special and
general courts-martial. See note 106 supra. Other rights embodied in the sixth amendment
have been extended to military accused by the Court of Military Appeals. See note 108
supra.
112. 16 C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
113. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
114. 16 C.M.A. at 634, 37 C.M.R. at 254.
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Courtney v. Williams, '1 5 in which the Court of Military Appeals held
that the party urging application of a different rule in the military
courts than that prevailing in civilian courts must bear the burden of
showing the necessity of a different rule.11 6 In Courtney, the court reaf-
firmed its earlier interpretation of Burns in United States v. Jacoby:'
7
"The protections of the Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly
or by implication inapplicable, are available to members of our armed
forces." 
118
When the UCMJ was adopted by Congress in 1950, the Supreme
Court had not set standards for the triers of fact in civilian criminal
prosecutions. Today, however, the rights afforded civilian citizens are
better defined.119 The holdings of the Military Court of Appeals that
the right to jury trial does not attach in court-martial proceedings' 20
have facilitated the summary dismissal of the related issues of jury size
and minimum voting requirements. Moreover, even if the right to a
sixth amendment jury trial is not mandated constitutionally,12' certain
aspects of the jury trial that have been set forth for civilian proceedings,
such as minimum size122 and voting requirements,1 23 have been scruti-
nized as elements of the fundamental fairness that the Supreme Court
in Burns and the Court of Military Appeals in Courtney recognized as
applicable to the military justice system. Refusal to apply these re-
quirements should only be permitted upon a showing of the necessity
for a different procedure.' 24
Statistical Bases for the Requirements of Minimum Size and Voting
Statistical studies suggesting that smaller juries are less likely to
foster group deliberation and may lead to "inaccurate fact-finding and
incorrect application of the common sense of the community to the
facts" 1 25 were considered in Ballew v. Georgia, 26 in which the Court set
115. 1 M.J. 267 (C.M.A. 1976).
116. Id. at 270.
117. 11 C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1967). See note 108 supra.
118. 1 M.J. at 270 (quoting United States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. at 430-31, 29 C.M.R. at
246-47).
119. See notes 15-33 & accompanying text supra.
120. See notes 108-09 & accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 85-106 & accompanying text supra.
122. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (requiring that there be a minimum six-
person jury in criminal prosecutions of non-petty offenses). See text accompanying notes 28-
31 supra & notes 136, 141-42 infra.
123. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (requiring that six-person juries render
unanimous verdicts). See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
124. Cf. United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116 (C.M.A. 1977) (rejecting a military excep-
tion rationale for denying a public trial for military accused). See note 108 supra.
125. Baliew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232 (1978).
126. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
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forth the standard that there must be a minimum of six members on a
jury in criminal prosecutions for non-petty offenses.1 27 Among the rea-
sons cited for the conclusion regarding smaller juries were that larger
groups are more likely to have members who can make critical contri-
butions to solving problems,1 28 larger juries have collectively better rec-
ollection of the evidence presented, 29 and larger groups tend to
counterbalance the prejudices of individuals.1
30
The statistical studies cited in Ballew also raise doubts about the
accuracy of the results achieved by small panels.13 These studies sug-
gest that the risk of convicting an innocent person rises as the size of the
jury diminishes. 32 The studies also indicate that as the size of the jury
becomes smaller the verdicts become more inconsistent. 133 In addition,
the Court noted that smaller juries tend to have less minority represen-
tation and, consequently, less representation of minority viewpoints.
34
In holding that this decreased representation resulted in significant
barriers to an effective jury trial, the Ballew Court cited work compiled
by two researchers who had summarized the findings of thirty-one
studies. The researchers "concluded that there were no conditions
under which smaller groups were superior in quality of group perform-
ance and group productivity."'
135
The Minimum Size Requirement
In United States v. Wolff,' 36 the Naval Court of Military Review
held as inapplicable to the military the standard set forth in Ballew. In
so doing, the Naval Court of Military Review apparently ignored the
rule establishing a preference for the civilian procedure in Courtney v.
Williams.'137 Had the court properly applied the rule in Courtney, the
burden would have been on the government to prove that military con-
ditions necessitated the use of a jury composed of fewer than six per-
127. These studies were prompted in part by the decision of the Supreme Court in Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), that a jury of six members does not violate the sixth
amendment right to jury trial in a criminal prosecution.
128. 435 U.S. at 233.
129.' Id.
130. Id. "In particular, the counter-balancing of various biases is critical to the accurate
application of the common sense of the community to the facts of any given case." Id. at
233-34.
131. Id. at 234.
132. Id "As the size diminished to five and below, the weighted sum of errors increased
because of the enlarging risk of the conviction of innocent defendants."
133. Id. at 234-35.
134. Id. at 236-37.
135. Id. at 233 n.l 1 (emphasis added).
136. 5 MJ. 923 (N.C.M.R. 1978),petition denied, 6 N.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1979).
137. 1 M.J. 267 (C.M.A. 1976). See text accompanying notes 114-17 supra. See notes
139-42 & accompanying text infra.
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sons when military personnel are prosecuted for serious offenses in
courts-martial, or that current military jury practices are more protec-
tive of an accused's rights than practices in use in civilian courts. In-
stead, the Wolff court placed the burden of proof on the accused and
found that the appellant had produced insufficient evidence to demon-
strate that the empirical data on which the Ballew decision was based
applied to trial by court-martial.
1 38
Despite the Wolff court's refusal to follow the holding in Courtney,
the Court of Military Appeals declined to rule on the issue. 139 The
Naval Court of Military Review's reason for rejecting the empirical ev-
idence considered in Ballew was that the data were "compiled in the
civilian community from juries randomly selected to represent a cross-
section of the community."140 The court reasoned that the Ballew data
are inapposite because military triers of fact are selected on a "best
qualified" basis. 141 This analysis seems to assume that the behavior of
best qualified military panels differs significantly from the behavior of
civilian juries. As the court in Wo/ff stated, "There is no showing that a
five-member court-martial does not render the same quality of justice
as does a larger court."' 142 This summary treatment of the Ballew stan-
dard permitted the Woo' court to conclude that "the due process to
which [the accused] is entitled [is] precisely what Congress contem-
plated when it enacted the [UCMJ]" without examining the fairness of
the UCMJ procedure.143
In such an examination, the military might argue that court-mar-
tial members are better qualified to decide guilt or innocence because
of the manner in which they are selected, 144 and therefore fewer mem-
bers are necessary for the same quality of deliberation. Military per-
sonnel, however, arguably are even less likely than civilians to
deliberate objectively because of the length of time in service necessary
to become jury members: soldiers have become socialized in the mili-
tary organization,1 45 resulting in a more homogeneous background, p0-
138. 5 M.J. at 925.
139. United States v. Wolff, 5 M.J. 923 (N.C.M.R. 1978), petition denied, 6 M.J. 305
(C.M.A. 1979); see also United States v. Corl, 6 M.J. 914 (N.C.M.R. 1979), certifiedfor review
on other grounds, 6 M.J. 304 (C.M.A. 1979),petitionfled, 7 M.J. 254 (C.M.A. 1979); United
States v. Meckler, 6 M.J. 779, 780 (A.C.M.R. 1978)petition denied, 7 M.J. 41 (C.M.A. 1979);
United States v. Montgomery, 5 M.J. 832, 834 (A.C.M.R. 1978),petition denied, 6 M.J. 89
(C.M.A. 1978). The Court of Military Appeals, after granting review of the issue in United
States v. Lamela, 6 M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 1978) (issue VIII), vacated the grant at 6 M.J. 32
(C.M.A. 1978). See United States v. Lamela, 7 M.J. 277 (C.M.A. 1979).




144. See notes 174-80 & accompanying text infra.
145. Except in rare instances, all members of the armed forces must attend indoctrina-
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tentially fewer different observations, and therefore less critical
deliberations.
146
In Ballew, the Supreme Court relied on studies indicating that
larger juries tend to offset biases. 147 It is difficult to see how a military
panel would differ. Moreover, the military panel may have more in-
herent biases than a civilian jury. For instance, the military court panel
members, normally at least two-thirds of whom are officers, must con-
sider the officer-enlisted person distinction that often influences an of-
ficer's perception of enlisted personnel. 148
The Ballew Court observed that a smaller panel would have less
minority representation, with a resultant decrease in the expression of
minority viewpoints.' 49 Such an occurrence might have a greater ad-
verse effect on the ability of a military court to deliberate fairly than it
would have on its civilian counterpart. As noted in Ballew, a person
with the minority view on a jury will be more likely to express and
maintain that view if at least one other person on a jury agrees with
him or her.150 In the military setting, however, each court member
must overcome the additional factor of rank in expressing his or her
views. Many studies have concluded that, in highly structured organi-
zations, status can hinder both the extent and quality of communica-
tion and a person's willingness to adhere to minority viewpoints.' 51
tion programs. Although the purposes of these programs vary depending on the level of
entry, all of the programs attempt to accomplish objectives of uniform behavior and imme-
diate, unquestioning obedience to orders and regulations. After indoctrination, each mem-
ber then must progress through the ranks. Because personnel are promoted only from
within the service and conformity to military requirements is a prerequisite to promotion, by
the time service members attain positions that would qualify them for court-martial duty,
they have internalized similar behaviors and developed similar expectations of others' be-
havior. Interview with Lt. Richard Tate, Chief of Leadership and Management Training,
United States Coast Guard, at Petaluma, California (June 1980).
146. See W. NORD, CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSY IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR ch.
5 (1972); J. Van Maanen, Observations on the Making ofPolcemen, 32 HUMAN ORGANIZA-
TION 4 (1973); L. Peters, D. Ford & J. Jolly, The Development and Accuracy of Initial
Organizational Expectations and Their Effects on Later Satisfaction (1977) (paper presented
at 37th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, Kissimmee, Florida) (on file with
the Hastings Law Journal).
147. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233-34 (1978).
148. Data gathered by the United States Coast Guard Leadership Development Staff
indicate that officers tend to have low expectations of enlisted personnel, especially with
regard to lower-ranking enlisted personnel, who often have less education. Interview with
Lt. Richard Tate, Chief of Leadership and Management Training, United States Coast
Guard, at Petaluma, California (June 1980).
149. 435 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1978).
150. Id. at 236.
151. See generally K. DAVIS, HUMAN BEHAVIOR AT WORK 400-01 (5th ed. 1977).
("There is a natural tendency for an employee to tell a superior what the employee thinks
the superior wants to hear."). E. FLIPPO & G. MUNSINGER, MANAGEMENT 243-48 (3d ed.
1975) ("Some research studies have shown that where status hierarchies are clear and con-
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The presence of a high ranking military member who sits, in uniform,
as president of a court may inhibit a group trying to reach a verdict in a
military trial in a way that would not arise in civilian jury delibera-
tion.152 As a result, lower ranking military personnel may feel unable
to vote as they would like, for fear of incurring the displeasure of the
more senior officer. This problem is compounded by the small number
of triers of fact in a court-martial proceeding.1 53 Thus, as the size of the
military courts diminishes, the inhibiting effect of the presence of senior
officers may increase as court members do not find their viewpoints
supported by other members of the court.
The Supreme Court in Ballew recognized that statistical studies
neither demonstrate the minimum jury size required to ensure fairness,
nor define a cause-and-effect formula that can be mechanically applied
in different situations. The studies, however, do provide the only basis
apart from "judicial hunch"'154 for determining an appropriate jury
size, and, in the absence of a demonstration on the part of the military
that there exist overriding demands of discipline and duty, that is, a
military necessity, as required by the Court of Military Appeals in
Courtney,155 it is submitted that the military would only in extreme
circumstances be able to show that the demands of duty or discipline
preclude the convening of juries who meet the Ballew requirements. 
56
The Voting Requirements
The same data and rationale that led the Supreme Court in Ballew
to set the minimum jury size at six 157 led the Court, in Burch v. Louisi-
ana, 58 to require that six-person juries render unanimous verdicts. In
the military justice system, however, the agreement of only two-thirds
of the court members is necessary to convict the accused. 59 In spite of
gruent, the amount of free interchange of information, suggestions and help is materially
reduced.").
152. Studies made by the United States Coast Guard Leadership and Management
School indicate that the expression by officers of their opinions tends to dampen the critical
thinking of those of less high rank. They have also found that less divergent views are
expressed in groups dominated by higher ranking officers. Interview with Lt. Richard Tate,
Chief of Leadership and Management Training, United States Coast Guard, at Petaluma,
California (June 1980). See also I. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK (1972).
153. See notes 48-54 & accompanying text supra.
154. Ballew v. Georgia 435 U.S. 223, 231 n.10 (1978).
155. Courtney v. Williams, 1 M.J. 267, 270 (C.M.A. 1976). See text accompanying notes
114-17 supra.
156. See notes 58-62 & accompanying text supra.
157. 435 U.S. 223, 223-39 (1978).
158. 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979).
159. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 52, 10 US.C. § 852 (1976). To sentence
an accused at court-martial to ten years imprisonment or less, only two-thirds of the mem-
bers must agree, while to sentence an accused to between ten years and life imprisonment,
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the smaller minimum size of the military panel, in United States v.
Gui'ford, 60 the Army Court of Military Review did not conclude that
military court members should be required to reach unanimous ver-
dicts when panels number fewer than six.
Guilford involved a seven-member court-martial that had reached
a verdict with the agreement of five members. The court correctly
noted that Burch did not govern because the Supreme Court in Burch
"expressly eschewed any intimation of its views as to the constitutional-
ity of nonunanimous verdicts rendered by juries of more than six mem-
bers." 161 The court, however, did not rest its decision "wholly on such
arithmetic observations."' 162 It rejected the Ballew and Burch standards
by relying on compositional and functional differences between mili-
tary triers of fact and civilian juries.
163
This distinction does not satisfy the requirement in Courtney that
the party urging a rule different from that used in the civilian process
show a necessity for a different rule.'6 That necessity must be based
upon overriding demands of discipline and duty to counterbalance
both the preference for the civilian process and the assumption that the
fundamental fairness constitutionally required by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment is measured by civilian standards.
65
The Guiyford court, however, merely stated that "the differences
between the institution of courts-martial and the institution known as a
jury have been recognized as necessary as well as constitutional,"'
66
citing O'Callahan v. Parker'67 as support. The O'Callahan Court, how-
ever, did not recognize differences in size and voting unanimity re-
quirements as necessary, but stated: "'lilt still remains true that military
tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such
a way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Con-
stitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal
only three-quarters of the members must agree. Unanimity is required only in cases in
which the death penalty is awarded.
160. 8 M.J 598 (A.C.M.R. 1979).
161. Id. at 601. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 n.11 (1979).
162. 8 MJ. at 601.
163. "The [military]. trial is, however, by a unique, military tribunal that is essentially
different from the jury envisioned by the Sixth Amendment. The composition of the courts-
martial is different, as the members are drawn exclusively from the accused's own profession
based on specified qualifications (one of which is judicial temperament), with specialized
knowledge of the professions, and subject to only one challenge other than for cause. Their
functioning differs, too. For example, it includes the questioning of witnesses and the deter-
mining of sentences. In view of such compositional and functional differences, the studies
relied upon in Ballew and Burch are inapposite." Id. at 602.
164. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 100-04 supra.
166. 8 Mi. at 602.
167. See text accompanying notes 76-80 supra.
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courts."' 16 8 This does not mean that, when military tribunals can be
constituted to reflect some of the same qualifications deemed essential
in civilian trials, they should not be. O'Callahan admonished the limi-
tation on these differences. 169 The O'Callahan Court recognized a jus-
tification for a separate system only so far as is "necessary to an
effective national defense establishment." 70 The observation made in
1969 that military courts-martial do not require unanimous verdicts
and may proceed "by practices different from those obtaining in the
regular courts and in general less favorable to defendants," 171 does not
satisfy the 1973 requirement of Courtney that the different rules be jus-
tified by the armed forces.
In a court-martial of an enlisted member of the armed forces, al-
lowing a lack of unanimity for conviction may deprive the accused of
the protections provided by peer representation on the panel. Absent a
request by the accused, none of the court members need be an enlisted
person. 72 If requested by the accused, only one-third of the members
must be from the enlisted ranks. 173 Because these members may be
drawn entirely from the senior enlisted pay grades, in which individu-
als may have interests more akin to those of officers than to those of a
low-ranking defendant, the presence of these senior personnel may not
provide any meaningful peer representation for the accused. Even if
one-third of the court members are peers, their effect on the outcome of
the court-martial is substantially diminished by the fact that unanimity
is not required to convict the accused. Thus, even if a court is com-
posed partially of peers who are sympathetic to the defendant and vote
for acquittal, the defendant may still be convicted by a vote of the re-
maining jury members.
The military justice system's refusal to apply the standards set
forth by the Supreme Court in Burch results in a lesser burden on the
trial counsel to convince a panel of non-peers of the accused's guilt.
Panels comprised of three to five persons, often non-peers of the ac-
cused, only two-thirds of whom must agree in order to sustain a convic-
tion, may unnecessarily deprive the accused of important constitutional
protections, and should not be allowed in the absence of extreme gov-
ernment necessity.I
74
168. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 262 (1969).
169. Id. at 26.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 25 (c)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 825(c)(1) (1976).
173. Id.
174. See generally Note, The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability of Conviction: An
Evaluation of Williams v. Florida, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 529 (1971); Note, Constitutional
Law-Jury Unanimity No Longer Required in State Criminal Trials, 51 N.C.L. REV. 134
(1972).
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The Selection Process
The due process afforded military personnel through the use of
five-person, non-unanimous juries in lieu of the six-member, unani-
mous juries mandated by the Supreme Court in civilian trials is further
affected by the selection process of the court-martial members. The
convening authority, usually a high-ranking officer, is granted the au-
thority to select court members for specific courts-martial. 75 This se-
lection is limited only by the broad standard that the officer choose
those "best qualified for the duty by reason of age, education, training,
experience, length of service, and judicial temperament."' 176
In the selection of members of a court-martial, the convening au-
thority is often in a unique position: the convening authority may be
ultimately responsible for the job performance and discipline of both
the accused and the court members. This dual responsibility may re-
sult in prejudice to the accused because the members of the court may
feel obligated and pressured to convict the defendant in order to please
the officer who convenes the court. The potential for prejudice to the
accused resulting from the selection process is increased by the possibil-
ity that the convening authority may rely on the knowledge and opin-
ions of subordinates in selecting the members of the court. 177 Even if
most convening authorities are not prejudiced and would select court
members only through the consideration of the grounds outlined in the
Department of Defense's Manualfor Courts-Martial,78 it is possible
that some convening authorities may select members on other grounds,
which might affect the findings of the jury or the sentence imposed by
the jury, but which might not constitute sufficient bias to warrant dis-
qualification. 7 9 In the military system, this potential for unfair
prejudice becomes significant because the accused is allowed only one
peremptory challenge.' 80 There is little opportunity for the accused to
remove a jury member for a reason that may affect that person's man-
ner of voting, but that does not rise to the level of a valid ground for
disqualification. Thus, the need for random jury selection in military
trials is clear. Without such a process, there remains little assurance
that a jury will be impartial.
Although it may be desirable to afford military personnel the same
175. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 4(d) (rev. ed.
1969).
176. Id.
177. See United States v. Kemp, 22 C.M.A. 152, 155, 46 C.M.R. 152, 155 (1973).
178. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
179. Such consideration might include a potential court member's attitude towards pun-
ishment and the importance of grooming or appearance regulations.
180. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 41, 10 U.S.C. § 841 (1976). See'also
Brookshire, Juror Selection Under the UnIform Code of Military Justice: Fact or Fiction, 58
MIL. L. REv. 71 (1972).
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constitutional rights as are afforded members of the civilian commu-
nity, the Court of Military Appeals has held that it cannot use its super-
visory authority over military justice to provide a system of random
selection of court members.18 1 Instead, this change in the selection pro-
cess must come from Congress. 182 In recognizing some of the perceived
inequities in the military system, however, the Court of Military Ap-
peals observed in United States v. McCarthy8 3 that "[clonstitutional
questions aside, the perceived fairness of the military justice system
would be enhanced immeasurably by congressional reexamination of
the presently utilized jury selection process." 84 In noting the inequities
of the military jury selection process without ruling on its constitution-
ality and in refusing to hear appeals on other fundamental sixth
amendment issues such as size, selection process, and voting require-
ments of the triers of fact, the Court of Military Appeals has in effect
prevented many military personnel from appealing their convictions
when they cannot afford to mount a collateral attack in federal district
court.
Conclusion
During the period in which the Supreme Court has defined the
right to jury trial as requiring certain minimum protections, the Naval
and Army Courts of Military Review have refused to apply Supreme
Court precedent to military trials, and the Court of Military Appeals
has steadfastly refused to rule on the questions of the size requirements,
voting requirements, and selection process of juries.18 5 The assumption
that the studies considered in Ballew do not predict a military jury's
behavior is neither explained by that court nor supported by the data.
In light of the fact that most studies demonstrate the unreliability of
smaller juries and that the studies do not show that smaller juries
achieve better results, 8 6 this conclusion is perhaps too facilely reached.
Military discipline requirements are crucial to the successful oper-
ation of an effective military. Even if it is impossible, for reasons of
military necessity, to provide a jury composed of a cross section of soci-
ety for military trials, providing six-member panels, requiring unani-
mous verdicts for conviction, and providing for the random selection of
courts-martial members would probably not adversely affect military
discipline. The military justice system would still have the means to
compile lists of qualified court members, and qualified members could
181. United States v. Kemp, 22 C.M.A. 152, 46 C.M.R. 152 (1973).
182. Id. at 154, 46 C.M.R. at 154.
183. 2 M.J. 26 (C.M.A. 1976).
184. Id. at 29 n.3.
185. See note 138 & accompanying text supra.
186. See note 134 & accompanying text supra.
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be randomly selected from this list instead of being personally selected
by an individual with statutorily mandated conflicts of interest; courts-
martial would still be comprised of socialized jurors who understand
the disciplinary needs of the military. The ability to provide a speedy
trial would not be affected. The authority to impose severe punish-
ments for serious crimes would be unaffected, and "beyond a reason-
able doubt" would remain the standard for conviction.
If the military courts were to adopt the Ballew and Burch stan-
dards, the quality of military jury deliberation probably would im-
prove, thus decreasing the possibility of the conviction of an innocent
person. By rejecting data demonstrating that smaller groups tend to
convict more innocent persons than larger groups, these courts mini-
mize the importance of effective group deliberation by maintaining a
lesser standard of due process for the defendant in cases in which the
distinction between crimes that are tried in the military or civilian
courts is the situs of the offenses. 8 7
The United States should not deny criminal defendants in the mil-
itary rights that have been determined to be fundamental by the
Supreme Court. The military courts have done so, however, through
their action or inaction concerning the rights afforded military defend-
ants in courts-martial proceedings. The desire to preserve military law,
with its overriding demands of discipline and duty, should ndt affect
the rights of any serviceperson accused of a crime, absent a showing of
extreme necessity. It is ironic that one who enters the armed forces and
who may risk his or her life in the service of country is thereby forced
to forego several significant constitutional rights.
Gary Michael Heil*
187. The Supreme Court's decision in Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971),
allows the military to exercise jurisdiction over members of the armed forces for all viola-
tions of the UCMJ that occur "on base." See note 81 & accompanying text supra. Thus, the
rights afforded an accused would vary depending simply on whether the offense was com-
mitted inside the fence that defines the boundaries of military reservation.
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